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No Harm, Still Foul: When an Injury-in-fact
Materializes in a Consumer Data Breach
BENJAMIN C. WEST*
In the consumer data breach context, courts have seemingly limited a plaintiff’s ability
to bring suit by applying the standing doctrine’s injury-in-fact requirement too
rigidly. This is unacceptable, as the law of standing should not leave consumers
without technology, without security, and without recourse. This Note challenges how
courts currently apply the injury-in-fact element in consumer data breach actions,
and proposes a new standard that better understands and considers previously
overlooked harms that are incurred upon a breach.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes how courts currently approach
standing in consumer data breach actions. Part II illuminates a plethora of real harms
that current approaches fail to consider. Part III addresses foreseeable
counterarguments. Lastly, Part IV urges courts to consider reforming current
approaches by stressing how a better understanding of what constitutes a sufficient
harm will ultimately provide adequate recourse to harmed consumers.

* J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2013, University of
California, Irvine. I want to thank Professor Scott Dodson for introducing me to the area of law that inspired
this Note, and for his invaluable feedback and suggestions. I dedicate this Note to my mother, Deborah West.
This Note would not have been possible without her unconditional love and support.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the valiant efforts of many of our parents and grandparents
to resist technological advancements, it is safe to say that technology has
carried the day. Thirty years ago, phones were the size of bricks, record
stores were still profitable, online-dating did not exist, and people still
had to leave the house to buy groceries. Today is quite different. As an
example, the phone currently in your pocket is more technologically
powerful than every single NASA computer used to get Neil Armstrong
to the moon.1
Technologic advancement comes with both benefits and new risks
of harm. Technology is part of everything we do now. Personal
information appears throughout emails, social media pages, and texts.
Scores of businesses maintain your credit or debit card information.
Whether you ordered a pizza online last week, bought new socks off of
Amazon, or decided to take an Uber into work this morning, chances are,
the information stored securely in your wallet is not as secure as you
think.
The biggest risk to stored consumer information is a data breach. As
the Third Circuit said, arguably with only modest overstatement, “[t]here
are only two types of companies left in the United States, according to
data security experts: ‘those that have been hacked and those that [do

1. Tibi Puiu, Your Smartphone Is Millions of Times More Powerful than All of NASA’s
Combined Computing in 1969 (Sept. 10, 2017, 1:53 PM), ZME SCI., www.zmescience.com/
research/technology/smartphone-power-compared-to-apollo-432.

K – WEST_9 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

February 2018]

2/10/2018 10:07 AM

NO HARM, STILL FOUL

703

not] know [they have] been hacked.’”2 In fact, in 2014, it was reported
that as many as “43% of companies have experienced a data
breach . . . . Even worse, the absolute size of the breaches [has been]
increasing exponentially.”3 Recent statistics have found that individuals
who have been the victim of a data breach are nine and a half times more
likely to become the victim of identity theft.4
When a data breach occurs, various laws provide consumers with
the ability to seek redress against the companies that failed to protect
their information. However, recent cases have limited a plaintiff’s ability
to bring suit in federal court by rigidly applying the standing doctrine’s
injury-in-fact requirement to consumer data breach suits.
Though the United States Supreme Court announced in Clapper
v. Amnesty International USA that allegations of potential harm must be
“certainly impending” to state a justiciable case,5 this standard severely
understates certain real harms attributable to data breaches. In 2016, the
Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins had a chance to remedy the
nearsightedness of Clapper, but the Court avoided deciding the issue
entirely.6
The purpose of this Note is not to attack the standing doctrine, but
rather to challenge how some courts currently apply the injury-in-fact
element in consumer data breach suits. This Note urges a different
understanding of injury-in-fact in relation to consumer data breach
cases: one that recognizes the real financial risks and psychological
harms to consumers. Specifically, the injury-in-fact requirement should
be applied with the understanding that a breach in and of itself is an
actual harm to consumers who are currently forced to use technology
without sufficient protection. This standard will allow consumers who
are harmed in less tangible and physical ways to have opportunities to
seek redress. In the case of a data breach, the law of standing ought not
leave consumers without technology, without security, and without
recourse.
This Note defends its proposed thesis in four parts. Part I describes
how courts currently approach standing in consumer data breach suits.
Part II illuminates a plethora of very real harms that these current
approaches fail to consider. Part III addresses foreseeable
2. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 360 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Nicole Perlroth, The
Year in Hacking, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2013, 9:10 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/the-year-in-hacking-by-the-numbers/?_r=0).
3. Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 360–61 (citing Elizabeth Weise, 43% of Companies Had a Data
Breach in the Past Year, USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/
09/24/data-breach-companies-60/16106197).
4. Identity Shield Identity Theft Statistics, STARR WRIGHT USA, http://test.wrightusa.com/
products/wright-identity-shield/statistics (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
5. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013).
6. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1553 (2016).
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counterarguments. Lastly, Part IV urges courts to consider reforming
current approaches to the injury-in-fact element of standing as it relates
to consumer data breach cases. The Note concludes by stressing how a
better understanding of what constitutes a sufficient harm in consumer
data breach suits will ultimately provide adequate recourse to harmed
consumers.
I. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO STANDING IN
CONSUMER DATA BREACH SUITS
A. THE ROAD TO CLAPPER
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution authorizes
federal courts to adjudicate only actual “cases” and “controversies.”7 The
Supreme Court has interpreted these words as prescribing judicial
limitations on the types of cases that can be brought before a court. The
standing doctrine is the most notable of these limits. Standing has been
understood as the determination of whether a specific person is the
proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication.8 “Current
standing doctrine purports to ask . . . whether plaintiffs have an adequate
stake in seeking judicial relief.”9 Standing prohibits courts from issuing
advisory opinions and from hearing moot or unripe cases.10
A plaintiff must show three elements to have standing.11 First, a
plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury.12 Second, a plaintiff must
allege that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct.13
Third, a plaintiff must allege that a favorable court decision is likely to
redress the injury.14 Importantly, the burden is on the plaintiff to satisfy
these elements.15
The most prominent issue of standing, as applied to consumer data
breach cases, concerns the injury element. A standing injury requires “an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
8. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975)) (“In essence the question of standing is whether [a] litigant is entitled to have [a] court decide
the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” (internal quotations omitted)).
9. Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1191 (2014).
10. Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 605, 606 (1992).
11. This Note only addresses the standing doctrine’s constitutional requirements, and does not
discuss any potential prudential requirements.
12. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
13. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 590 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 561.
15. See id. at 566 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(“SCRAP”), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)) (“Standing is not ‘an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable,’ but [instead] requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible harm.”).
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particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent.”16 A plaintiff’s alleged
injury “must be . . . distinct and palpable, and not abstract or conjectural
or hypothetical.”17 More specifically, most courts grapple with the issue
of whether an alleged risk of future harm caused by a data breach is a
sufficient injury-in-fact. A majority of courts have held that where a
plaintiff fails to allege an injury that is either “actual or imminent,” there
is no standing under Article III.18 Nevertheless, a number of
“courts . . . have held that the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied
by a threat of future harm or by any act that harms plaintiff only by
increasing the risk of future harm that plaintiff would have otherwise
faced, absent defendant’s actions.”19 A notable example of this is
illustrated by Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Supreme Court held that
Massachusetts as well as other states had suffered a sufficient injuryin-fact in order to proceed in a suit against the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) for failing to regulate carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases as pollutants.20 In holding that plaintiffs had standing,
the Court stressed that “the rise in sea levels associated with global
warming has already harmed and will continue to harm [states]. The risk
of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real.”21
The Supreme Court’s prominent Clapper opinion addressed what
kind of future harm satisfies the injury-in-fact element of standing in
relation to government surveillance suits.22 In Clapper, attorneys and
human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations challenged section
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which authorized
governmental surveillance of non-U.S. persons “reasonably believed to
be located outside of the United States.”23 In asserting that Article III
standing was met, the plaintiffs argued that the nature of their work
“require[d] them to engage in sensitive international communications
with . . . likely targets” of the Act, and that there was an “objectively
reasonable likelihood that their communications [would] be
acquired . . . at some point in the future.”24 The Court rejected this
argument, stressing that there was no evidence that plaintiffs had been
placed under surveillance and the fact that plaintiffs could be surveilled
at some point in the future was insufficient.25 The Court maintained that
16. Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)) (internal quotations
omitted).
17. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
18. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
19. DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: A GUIDE TO CYBERLAW AND DATA PRIVACY LAW § 31.03
(Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2017).
20. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 498 (2007).
21. Id. at 526.
22. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013).
23. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2006)).
24. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142.
25. Id. at 1148.
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plaintiffs’ theory of future injury was “too speculative to satisfy the
well-established requirement that threatened injury must be ‘certainly
impending.”26 The Court held that allegations of future harm can only
establish Article III standing if the alleged harm is “certainly
impending.”27 For the Court, “allegations of possible future injury are not
sufficient.”28
The plaintiffs in Clapper alternatively argued that they had suffered
present injury because the risk of surveillance had already “forced them
to take costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of
their international communications.”29 In rejecting this argument, the
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could not “manufacture standing by
choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is
not certainly impending.”30
The Supreme Court has not yet explained how far Clapper extends.
In Spokeo, a Virginia man named Thomas Robins (“plaintiff”) brought
suit against a “people search engine” company (Spokeo), when the
company published false information about him.31 The false information
indicated that plaintiff was wealthy, married with children, and worked
in a professional or technical field.32 In fact, plaintiff was not married,
did not have children, and was unemployed and looking for work.33 The
issue before the Court was whether a plaintiff has standing when a web
company posts incorrect information about him, where the harm has yet
to materialize. The Court did not answer that question but instead, in a
6-2 decision, concluded that the Ninth Circuit had failed to consider
standing fully.34 The Court remanded the case to allow the Ninth Circuit
to apply the injury-in-fact requirement in the first instance.35 However,
in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that the plaintiff had alleged a
sufficient injury-in-fact because Spokeo’s misrepresentation of personal
details had harmed plaintiff’s job prospects.36
B. CLAPPER APPLIED
Although Clapper was not a consumer data breach case, courts have
applied the Clapper standard to consumer data breach suits.37 For
26. Id. at 1143.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1147 n. 9.
29. Id. at 1143.
30. Id.
31. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543 (2016).
32. Id. at 1546.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1553.
35. Id. at 1554.
36. Id. at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
37. Both the Second and Fourth Circuits have relied on Clapper in finding allegations of increased
risk of harm insufficient to confer standing. See King & Spalding, D.C. Circuit Revives Data Breach
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example, in Whalen v. Michaels Stores Inc., a trial court in the Second
District followed Clapper in finding a lack of standing in a suit where
customers alleged an increased risk of future harm.38 There, Michaels
notified customers of “possible fraudulent activity” on some of Michaels’
customers’ credit cards whose data Michaels kept and maintained.39
Three months later, Michaels confirmed the existence of a security
breach.40 According to the company’s press release, hackers used
malicious software to retrieve the credit card information from the
systems of Michaels stores and its subsidiary, Aaron Brothers.41 Michaels
estimated that approximately 2.6 million credit or debit cards may have
been affected during the time period of the alleged breach.42 Whalen
alleged that she had suffered damages arising out of “costs associated
with identity theft and the increased risk of identity theft,” namely, lost
time and money associated with credit monitoring and other riskmitigation efforts, though she conceded that “fraudulent use of cards
might not be apparent for years.”43
Applying Clapper, the court rejected Whalen’s argument and held
that she lacked standing, reasoning that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture
standing” through credit monitoring.44 The court maintained that “[i]f
the law were otherwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure
a lower standard for Article III standing simply by making an
expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear.”45
Similarly, in Storm v. Paytime, Inc., a district court judge found a
lack of standing based on Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard in a
class action suit against a payroll service company.46 There, a data breach
exposed employees’ confidential personal and financial information,
including full legal names, addresses, bank-account information, social
security numbers, and dates of birth.47 Although the breach occurred on
April 7, 2014, the defendant did not discover the breach until April 30,
2014.48 Moreover, the defendant waited until May 12, 2014 to begin
notifying affected employers of the breach.49 The plaintiffs in Storm
claimed “that nationally, over 233,000 individuals had their personal
Putative Class Action on Standing Grounds, Widens Circuit Split, JD SUPRA (Aug.
22, 2017), www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/d-c-circuit-revives-data-breach-78728.
38. Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
39. Id. at 578.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 579.
44. Id. at 581.
45. Id.
46. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 364 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
47. Id. at 363.
48. Id.
49. Id.

K – WEST_9 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

708

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

2/10/2018 10:07 AM

[Vol. 69:701

and financial information ‘misappropriated’ as a result of the breach of
[defendant’s] computer network.”50 They brought suit alleging that as a
result of the data breach, “they . . . have spent, or will need to spend, time
and money to protect themselves from identity theft.”51
The plaintiffs also asserted present damages.52 One class
member a government employee who needed security clearance to
perform his job had his security clearance suspended as a result of the
breach and was required to work at a different job site which resulted in
a four hour increase in his daily commute.53 He alleged that the increased
commute caused him to incur travel expenses and lost time.54
In dismissing the suit for lack of standing, the court embraced
Clapper by finding “no factual allegation of misuse or that such misuse is
certainly impending.”55 The court found that plaintiffs did not allege that
their bank accounts had been accessed, that credit cards had been opened
in their names, or that unknown third parties had used their social
security numbers to impersonate them and gain access to their
accounts.56 “In sum, their credit information and bank accounts look the
same today as they did prior to [defendant’s] data breach.”57
Many courts have agreed that, following Clapper, increased risk
alone cannot meet the injury-in-fact requirement in consumer data
breach cases because the harm is “merely speculative.”58 However, some
courts have approached the issue differently.59 Notably, the Seventh
Circuit, in In re Adobe Systems Privacy Litigation, distinguished
Clapper in a consumer data breach suit and refused to apply its “certainly
impending” standard.60 “Unlike in Clapper, where respondents’ claim
that they would suffer future harm rested on a chain of events that was
both ‘highly attenuated’ and ‘highly speculative,’” the court found that
“the risk that Plaintiffs’ personal data will be misused by the hackers who
breached Adobe’s network is immediate and very real.”61
Similarly, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, the Seventh
Circuit again distinguished the harms alleged in Clapper from the harms
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 364.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 366.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (Clapper
compels rejection of [plaintiff’s] claim that an increased risk of identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the
injury-in-fact requirement for standing.”).
59. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits have all held that increased risk of harm is
sufficient for standing purposes. King & Spalding, supra note 37.
60. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
61. Id. at 1214.

K – WEST_9 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE)

February 2018]

2/10/2018 10:07 AM

NO HARM, STILL FOUL

709

alleged in a consumer data breach suit.62 In Remijas, 350,000 account
cards were potentially exposed to malicious malware that infiltrated
Neiman Marcus’s computer systems.63 Over 9000 of those cards were
then used fraudulently.64 In finding that those consumers who had
alleged only imminent future injuries had standing, the court
emphasized that plaintiffs in a data theft case are differently situated
from the plaintiffs in Clapper.65 In particular, the victims of the Neiman
Marcus data breach did not “need to speculate as to whether [their]
information [had] been stolen . . . .”66 Both parties agreed that the
information had been taken, and for the court, this was sufficient.67 The
court found that “[defendant’s] customers should not have to wait until
hackers commit identity theft or credit card fraud in order to give the
class standing, because there is an ‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ that
such an injury will occur.”68 The court stated that “[p]resumably, the
purpose of the hack [was], sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or
[to] assume [plaintiffs’] identities.”69 In maintaining that there was an
“objectively reasonable likelihood” that identity theft would occur to all
consumers involved in the consumer data breach, the court rhetorically
asked: “Why else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal
consumers’ private information?”70 Given this important notion, the
court found that plaintiffs’ “allegations of future injury are sufficient” to
establish standing.71
Other courts have found that allegations of a substantial risk of
harm, along with reasonably incurred mitigation costs following a data
breach, are sufficient to establish a cognizable injury and confer standing
under Article III. For example, in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co., the Sixth Circuit found that various costs (in both time
and money) commonly incurred by victims of identity theft and fraud are
sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact standing requirement.72 The court
there stated that “[w]here [p]laintiffs already know that they have lost
control of their data, it would be unreasonable to expect [them] to wait
for actual misuse a fraudulent charge on a credit card, for
example before taking steps to ensure their own personal and financial

62. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
63. Id. at 690.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 693.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)).
69. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 694.
72. Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16840, at
*9 (6th Cir. Sep. 12, 2016).
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security.”73 For the court, “these [preventative] costs are a concrete injury
suffered to mitigate an imminent harm, and satisfy the injury
requirement of Article III standing.”74
II. RETHINKING INJURY IN CONSUMER DATA-BREACH SUITS
Neither the majority nor the minority position has it completely
right. Both camps fail to appreciate that consumer data breach victims
suffer both a credible risk of future injury and a concrete present injury,
and that these injuries are sufficient to confer standing, even under
Clapper.
Clapper drew a distinction between “certainly impending” and
merely “possible” future harm. Critically, though Clapper was a
government surveillance case, there was no allegation that the plaintiffs
were under surveillance.75 The plaintiffs argued that the type of work they
engaged in made it objectively reasonable that their communications
would eventually be subject to government surveillance, but the Court
concluded that the likelihood of surveillance was “too speculative” to be
considered an actual harm under the standing doctrine.76 Further, there
was no concrete present injury in Clapper, but the Court stated that
actual unlawful surveillance alone would have been a sufficient harm.77
In the consumer data breach context, by contrast, possible risk of
harm is not speculative. When a consumer data breach occurs, it means
that someone has deliberately taken consumer information for misuse.
Breaches do not occur randomly. Data thieves steal information to use it.
Even if the stolen data is not used for a number of years or even if it is
not used at all this does not discount the fact that private information
is in the wrong hands and consumers are forced to live with a heightened
risk of identity theft.
Further, consumer data breach victims suffer actual present harm.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Clapper, who had not yet been surveilled, a data
breach victim’s privacy has been breached. Victims of a data breach suffer
several present injuries, including financial loss associated with attempts
to mitigate the risk of identity theft, lost time, and psychological harms
that arise from the breach itself.
A. FUTURE RISK OF INJURY
No one questions whether respondents’ communications in Clapper
would have been surveilled at some point, given that respondents were
lawyers and rights organizations who spoke regularly to persons the Act
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1141 (2013).
Id. at 1143.
Id. at 1153.
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was created to target. As such, Clapper arguably was wrongly decided.
However, even if Clapper was correctly decided, the “certainly
impending” standard is misapplied in the consumer data breach context
because its application severely understates very real harms. In a
consumer data breach suit, a breach has occurred. Private information is
no longer secure. It is no longer in the hands of the entities charged with
protecting it. Instead, it is in the hands of people who ultimately plan to
use it for personal gain. As such, a future risk of harm ceases to be
speculative once there has been a data breach. Once a breach occurs,
there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that the information has or
will ultimately end up in the wrong person’s hands.
That the risk may be small does not make it too speculative to confer
standing, either. The degree of risk will likely be considered in
determining proper damages; however, even a small risk of identity theft
should constitute actual harm for standing purposes. Any heightened
risk creates a fear that is objectively reasonable. The fact that consumers
may never suffer financial harm does not discount the fact that
consumers will undoubtedly respond to the heightened risk in ways that
reflect sufficient actual harms. Critics could rightfully argue that the risk
is still a question of whether, not when, consumers will incur
non-financial harms resulting from consumer data breach. However,
Subpart B of this Part importantly shows that there are property and
privacy rights that presume actual harm as soon as a breach occurs,
regardless of whether the data is fraudulently used.
Further, Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard cannot exclude a
data breach risk of future harm just because the risk is long-term. A risk
that was not present before is a harm. As such, long-term risk is still an
actual harm. Unlike a claim against a thief for future misuse, here,
companies are data-confidants who breached their duty to keep private
information secure. Consumers do not really have a choice in releasing
their private information to companies. As such, the injury caused by the
failures of companies to protect confidential information is ripe
immediately upon a data breach. Just like business partners can be
jointly and severally liable,78 here too the companies do not escape
liability just because identity thieves are equally or more blameworthy.
As discussed later, when individuals believe they are at risk of harm, it
can have negative psychological effects. People respond differently when
there is a risk of harm, as opposed to when they feel secure. As an
illustration, many individuals will stick to the beaten path even though
traveling via new terrain could lead them to their destination in less time.
Lost time is an actual harm and the risk of the unknown is what led to the
lost time here. In the consumer data breach context, having to take extra

78. See Nat’l Biscuit Co. v. Stroud, 106 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 1959).
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precautions because a data thief mishandled a victim’s personal
information is not speculative, unnecessary, or irrational. It is how the
vast majority of people act in these situations, and it is in itself actual
harm.
A consumer data breach creates a risk that was not present before.
In demanding that a risk be likely to happen sooner rather than later in
order to constitute an actual harm, the Clapper “certainly impending”
standard and others disregard the actual harm that occurs simply by
being subjected to a new risk. Courts should not even assess whether a
risk is “certainly impending” or “substantial” enough. Instead, courts
should only consider whether a new risk to a consumer has been created
by the breach.
Simply put, a “certainly impending” standard at least as it is
applied to data breach cases misunderstands that any risk of future
harm is an actual harm incurred by consumers. Clapper’s “certainly
impending” standard makes it almost impossible for plaintiffs to bring
consumer data breach suits by forcing them to wait until the harm
materializes into some tangible or physical harm. This flawed
understanding of what constitutes a sufficient injury-in-fact creates a
host of issues. Importantly, by forcing consumers to wait until harm
materializes into a tangible or physical harm, injured consumers risk not
being able to pursue recompense at all.
To illustrate this, “the more time that passes between a data breach
and an instance of identity theft, the more latitude a defendant has to
argue that the identity theft is not ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s data
breach.”79 The words “fairly traceable” here serve to ensure that the
causal connection between action and injury is sufficient.80 If a consumer
has to wait for a harm to “materialize,” as each year passes, it becomes
easier for defendant companies to argue that the harm is not a result of
the data breach. In essence, the result means that consumers who are
actually harmed by data breaches have no opportunity to seek reprieve.
Take, for example, Target’s 2013 consumer data breach, where tens of
thousands of customers’ account information details were taken.81 When
a data breach of that magnitude occurs, attackers likely cannot use the
stolen information over the course of twenty-four hours. Depending on
how much data is taken, it could be years before breached information is
misused. If the Target consumers are forced to wait until they are able to
prove that fraudulent identity theft has occurred or is otherwise

79. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Adobe
Sys., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 2014)) (citation omitted).
80. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
81. Jim Finkle & Dhanya Skariachan, Target Cyber Breach Hits 40 Million Payment Cards at
Holiday Peak, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2013, 4:05 PM), www.reuters.com/article/us-target-breach-idUSB
RE9BH1GX20131219.
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“certainly impending,” their case becomes infinitely harder to prove. In a
situation like this, there is nothing to stop Target from claiming the
breach was years ago and the information could have been obtained from
any number of places. This is flawed justice as it lets companies avoid
liability even though consumers were harmed as a direct result of their
negligence in protecting private information. If the attackers do not use
the obtained information for a decade or more, this does not discount the
fact that it was because of Target’s failure to protect consumer account
information that the attackers had obtained the ability to use the
information in the first place. What Clapper’s “certainly impending”
standard does is discount the real harms that consumers incur, such that
entities like Target are able to build defenses based on the amount of time
that has passed between the breach and the fraudulent activity.
Additionally, a standard that forces consumers to wait until a risk is
“certainly impending” or more tangible creates the possibility that people
will not be able to seek redress for their injuries. This is especially true
since many states have a seemingly short statute of limitations for
identity theft cases.82 For example, in California, the statute of
limitations for identity theft cases is four years, and begins to run as soon
as the crime is discovered.83 To illustrate the gravity of the issue this
creates, in Storm, it was ultimately determined that an estimated
233,000 consumers had their private information stolen by the breach.84
As such, depending on the number of culprits, it is likely impossible to
fraudulently use every individual consumer’s data within a four year
period.
Applying the Clapper standard to consumer data breach suits
creates a very real threat by making it immensely difficult for consumers
to bring suits within the limitations period. Under the Clapper standard,
plaintiff consumers when they are finally able to have standing at some
point in the future suffer the possibility of being barred by a short
statute of limitations; all because Clapper made an allegation of
increased
risk
of
harm
insufficient
to
satisfy
the
injury-in-fact standing requirement.
B. PRESENT INJURIES
In addition to a risk of future harm, consumer data breach victims
suffer a number of actual present injuries such as presumed harm,
financial harm, lost time, and psychological harm. These are actual
harms that occur immediately upon a consumer data breach.

82. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 803, A.B. 1105 (West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art.
12.01(3)(G) (West 2017).
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 803, A.B. 1105 (West 2017).
84. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
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1. Presumed Harm
Using a “certainly impending” standard to determine whether an
alleged risk of future harm satisfies the injury-in-fact element of standing
in consumer data breach suits further misses the point because even
though an alleged risk of future harm in and of itself is an actual harm,
we need not look that far. Even if there is no risk of future harm, the
infringement of important legal rights presumes an actual harm.
The law recognizes this principle in a wide range of contexts,
including battery, slander per se, and trespass. Take battery for instance.
In Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc., a talk show host lit
a cigar and intentionally and repeatedly blew smoke in the face of an
appearing guest who happened to be a nationally known antismoking
advocate.85 The guest sued for battery alleging that the host blowing
smoke in his face was “for the purpose of causing physical discomfort,
humiliation, and distress.”86 The court, in finding a valid claim, held that
“[c]ontact which is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity is
offensive contact” for battery purposes.87
Additionally, certain language in and of itself is actionable as slander
per se without proof of special damages.88 A notable example is situations
where a person is falsely accused of having committed a crime. Further
still, courts overwhelmingly find standing in suits involving claims of
intentional trespass even though there is generally no physical or
noticeable harm involved. This is because “[t]he law infers some damage
from every direct entry upon the land of another.”89 In Jacque
v. Steenberg Homes, despite multiple objections from plaintiff
homeowner, a mobile home selling company intentionally trespassed
across private land.90 Though traveling through plaintiff’s field resulted
in only nominal physical damages, the court found that a punitive
damages award of $100,000 against the mobile home company was
reasonable.91 The court maintained that individuals have a “legal right to
exclude others from private property” and that this right would be
“hollow if the legal system provide[d] insufficient means to protect it.”92
If not for the longstanding notion of protecting property interests,
the court’s holding in Jacque would be hard pressed to satisfy the
standing requirements of Article III. If property interests were taken out
of the equation, the only injury to plaintiff would have been a damaged

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Commc’ns, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 698 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
Id.
Id. at 699.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 380 (1974).
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997).
Id. at 609.
Id. at 610.
Id. at 618.
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ego. “I told them not to do it, and they did it anyway,” is not a very
compelling basis for standing purposes. The point here is not to discredit
how the standing doctrine is currently applied to intentional trespass
suits, but rather to embrace the analogy of the harm suffered in those
cases to the harm suffered in consumer data breach suits. Similar to the
harm incurred from an intentional trespass, individuals whose personal
information is taken or used without permission immediately suffer an
injury-in-fact.
Confidential details of a person’s life can be obtained in a data
breach. As shown throughout our nation’s jurisprudence, privacy is a
right ratified in a number of statutes.93 One notable example is Article I,
section 1 of California’s Constitution, which states that the pursuit and
obtainment of privacy is an inalienable right.94 This right to privacy is not
limited to states, as the right to privacy has been implied throughout the
federal Constitution most notably in the Fourth Amendment.95 In the
consumer data breach context, the federal Stored Communications Act
prevents electronic communication providers from handing over a
consumer’s private information except for clearly defined exceptions.96
This statute serves to show that consumers do not give up their property
or privacy rights to a company just by using their services. And like
battery, slander per se, and trespass, the harm that accrues may not be
seen on the surface. When an individual’s right to property or right to
privacy has been infringed upon, there is harm regardless of whether the
personal data has been used.
2. Actual Financial Harm
Knowing that a breach has occurred certainly causes time and
expense because the victim must monitor and take steps to minimize the
risk, such as reissuing credit cards, putting stop orders on payments, or
fearing credit-report impacts. Take, for example, the risk of identity theft.
It has been reported that “[t]he most commonly alleged injury in the
wake of a data breach is an increased risk of future identity theft.”97 If a
bank were to call a customer and say that the customer’s credit card
information had been stolen, but that the card has not yet been used
anywhere, it is unlikely that the customer would just go about her day
93. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2015).
94. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy
is recognized and shall not be infringed.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“The
right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be
infringed . . . .”).
95. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.
97. Robert D. Fram et al., Standing in Data Breach Cases: A Review of Recent Trends,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.bna.com/standing-data-breach-n57982063308 (citation
omitted).
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content with that knowledge. Indeed, the customer would be reasonably
inclined to immediately cancel her credit card. And for the next few
months, the customer likely would monitor her other accounts. This is
because, when a data breach occurs, victims carry objectively reasonable
beliefs that the information has landed in the wrong hands for purposes
of misuse. Simply put, when it comes to consumer data breaches, there
is nothing “speculative” about the incurred harm.
At the very least, victims of a data breach have to take the time to
cancel and obtain new credit cards. This undeniably derails business
dealings or time-sensitive purchases. Moreover, during this time,
consumers likely are not able to use their accounts. Furthermore, it is
likely that these consumers will have to change all of their online records
of bank account or credit card information stored in the various websites
we all use. The loss of time and money associated with a breach is an
actual financial harm, and currently, courts are not recognizing this
under Clapper.
3. Actual Psychological Harm
Even without the loss of time and money, there is a more basic
harm the invasion of privacy itself. On its own, a breach constitutes a
sufficient harm for standing purposes because of the presumed
psychological harms associated with it. There is actual harm at the breach
stage, regardless of whether there is evidence that the obtained data was
improperly “used.” Though for the most part, psychological harm has
already been a basis for satisfying the injury in fact element for consumer
data breach suits, the importance of acknowledging this type of harm
bears repeating. “If [a] plaintiff can show that there is a possibility that
[a] defendant’s conduct may have a future effect, even if the injury has
not yet occurred, the court may hold that standing has been satisfied.”98
To illustrate this point, in many states, “an entry alone is sufficient”
for an act to be considered burglary.99 Imagine coming home from work
and finding your front door ajar. After either calling the police or bravely
self-investigating the premises, you determine that a stranger has
definitely been inside your home, but that it is unclear whether anything
has actually been taken. At this moment, you are likely unnerved because
someone has been inside your home without your permission; a home
you originally thought of as secure. Thoughts encapsulate you. If this
person was able to get into your home once, what is to stop them from
obtaining access again? Better yet, did they take something that you just
cannot pinpoint at this moment? For a court to say that you have not been

98. CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1785.1 (3d ed. 2005).
99. People v. Davis, 18 Cal. 4th 712, 720–21 (Cal. 1998) (discussing the “entry” element under
California’s definition of burglary).
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harmed in this hypothetical situation would be ludicrous.100 Aside from
the obvious psychological effects, your legal rights to privacy and
property have been violated.
A 2015 study into the psychological trauma experienced by data
breach victims found that identity theft victims often experience
emotions similar to those of trauma survivors or persons who have been
victims of a home invasion or assault.101 As such, just as a court would
not let a burglar go free just because a homeowner cannot prove
something was taken, courts in consumer data breach suits should not
dismiss cases by applying standards that are inadequate in the data
breach context. Like seeing the front door of one’s home ajar, the theft of
personal data affects a person in a myriad of ways that are not simply
tangible or seen on the surface.
It is objectively reasonable for a person to become distressed upon
hearing that personal details about them have been breached. When a
person’s credit card is stolen, that person reasonably might respond by
feeling worried, scared, angry, or stressed. Having to worry, because of a
breach, that you might not be able to pay rent, or buy diapers, can
seriously take a toll on a person’s wellbeing. To put this in perspective,
stress alone has been linked to the six leading causes of death: heart
disease, cancer, lung ailments, accidents, cirrhosis of the liver and
suicide.102 It is not necessary to nitpick in determining what likelihood of
psychological harm is sufficient for standing purposes, because as
addressed previously, psychological harm is but one of many harms
inflicted as a result of a data breach. Though the psychological effects can
and likely will differ from individual to individual, this does not change
the fact that there is always a possibility that a breach could negatively
affect the mental health of a person. As such, psychological harm is an
injury-in-fact that should be considered actual harm for standing
purposes.
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS
One argument against this Note’s proposed thesis is that the
standing doctrine’s purpose is to conserve judicial resources rather than
broaden federal jurisdiction. The idea is that if plaintiffs are able to bring
suits without showing that a sufficient injury has occurred, judicial
resources will be spread too thin hearing claims that are miniscule,

100. For an infographic that shines a light on how victims of burglaries have been psychologically
affected, see The Psychological Effects of Burglary: Infographic, VERISURE (June
11, 2016), blog.verisure.co.uk/psychological-effects-of-burglary.
101. EQUIFAX, A LASTING IMPACT: THE EMOTIONAL TOLL OF IDENTITY THEFT (2015),
https://www.equifax.com/assets/PSOL/15-9814_psol_emotionalToll_wp.pdf.
102. Deborah S. Hartz-Seeley, Chronic Stress Is Linked to the Six Leading Causes of Death, MIAMI
HERALD (Mar. 21, 2014, 11:53 AM), www.miamiherald.com/living/article1961770.html.
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frivolous, or otherwise unwarranted. Courts want to reserve their
resources for cases where there is truly a need for judicial facilitation.
This Note respects this contention and does not attempt here to discredit
the importance of preserving judicial resources. It is true that
implementation of this proposed understanding of actual harm allows
more consumers to seek redress. However, though more suits will be
brought, this only means that justice is finally being afforded individuals
who will now be able to have their cases heard on the merits. This Note
does not suggest that all claims will be found to have merit once
adjudicated. Rather, this Note simply calls for an understanding of
injury-in-fact that will afford actually harmed victims of consumer data
breaches the opportunity to finally be heard on the merits.
Opponents to this Note’s proposed standing interpretation may
argue that consumers currently seek redress from companies rather than
the attackers who triggered the breach, and that this proposed standing
definition would hurt defendant companies. It is true that this proposed
understanding creates a burden on companies to constantly work to
protect the confidential information of consumers. However, just
because one party here, the attackers can be sued, does not mean that
other culpable parties such as the defendant companies should not be
held accountable for their own failures. Data collectors are under a legal
obligation to keep customer data secure103 and should be held
accountable under the law when they fail to do so. Furthermore, this
proposed understanding will force entities to actively seek out new ways
to fully protect the private information provided by consumers.
To illustrate this point, one only need look back to the defendant
entity in Storm. There, the breach occurred on April 7, 2014; the
defendant entity did not discover the breach until 23 days after the
breach occurred, and, more importantly, the defendant entity did not
begin notifying plaintiff consumers until almost two weeks after the
company discovered the breach.104 Under the proposed interpretation of
what constitutes an actual harm in consumer data breach suits outlined
in this Note, the severe oversight and unacceptable delay in notification
by defendant entity in Storm would likely not have occurred. Instead,
defendant entities, knowing that a breach will give rise to litigation, will
likely spend more time and resources monitoring and finding further
ways to protect consumer information.

103. Depending on the type of entity and data, there are a number of regulations in place that
require entities to provide reasonable security for sensitive information. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681
(2017) (referred to as the Fair Credit Reporting Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1828b (1999) (referred to as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
104. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
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IV. REFORMING THE CASE LAW
As shown throughout this Note, courts are incorrectly applying
Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard to the consumer data breach
context. By applying this “certainly impending” standard, these courts
are neglecting very real harms suffered by consumers. The new
understanding of injury in consumer data breach cases proposed by this
Note serves to prevent this continued injustice. To illustrate this new
understanding’s effect, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Whalen, applying
Clapper, held that credit-monitoring costs were not a sufficient harm.105
Under this Note’s proposed standing interpretation, the plaintiff in
Whalen would not have had her case dismissed for lack of standing.
Instead, the suit would have been adjudged on the merits of the case.
Though it is uncertain whether a judge or jury would have ultimately
found the defendant company liable, at least the plaintiff in Whalen
would have had her day in court.
Likewise, in Storm, the Third Circuit in adhering to the “certainly
impending” standard of Clapper expressly overlooked a plaintiff who
had suffered very real harm by having to spend additional costs and
hours commuting to a separate location for work.106 There, the data
breach made it so he could no longer use his government security
clearance.107 This injustice would not have occurred under the standing
interpretation proposed by this Note. This is because in Storm, actual
financial harm, psychological harm, and risk of future injury were all
evident. Under the standard proposed by this Note, plaintiffs in Storm
would have had their case heard and adjudged on the merits.
Though cases like In re Adobe, Remijas, and Galaria did not adhere
to Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard, the courts there were only
able to satisfy standing by finding impressive ways to distinguish Clapper
from the consumer data breach context. Under this Note’s theory of
standing, these courts would not have had to work so hard. These courts
all found standing to be satisfied by acknowledging some of the actual
harms addressed in this Note, however, none of these courts went so far
as to list as extensively the plethora of harms that should satisfy the
injury-in-fact element of standing in the realm of consumer data breach
cases. Instead of grasping to one type of harm as these cases did, this new
understanding of what constitutes a sufficient injury-in-fact in consumer
data breach suits comes with an arsenal of understood actual harms that
will pass standing inspection.
If the nearsighted Clapper standard ceases to apply to consumer
data breach suits, the question of standing in Spokeo will be an
105. Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (applying Clapper
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013).
106. Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 363.
107. Id.
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open-and-shut case upon its return to the Ninth Circuit. There, the court
will find that Robins was sufficiently harmed when Spokeo listed false
information about him. However, until the Supreme Court revisits the
matter, the “certainly impending” standard will continue to create
uncertainty as to whether a person who has actually been harmed will
satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing.
CONCLUSION
This Note illuminates how courts are currently misapplying one
element of the standing doctrine specifically the injury-in-fact
element to the particular context of consumer data breach suits.
Further, this Note serves to call upon courts to re-evaluate what
constitutes an actual harm in the consumer data breach context. Though
this Note likely does not exhaust all of the actual harms incurred by
consumers upon a data breach, it does serve to highlight certain common
and undeniable actual harms. These harms include increased risk of
future harm, presumed harm, financial harm associated with the breach
itself, and psychological harm. This proposed interpretation
acknowledges these very real harms, where current standards have failed
to do so. The interpretation further serves to protect and compensate
consumers who have suffered these real harms. Lastly, by placing the
burden on companies, this proposed interpretation incentivizes these
entities to take stronger measures to protect consumers, by constantly
seeking better ways of preventing the theft of private information.

